Suffering Weak Applications of the Melian Dialogue

Why American politicians must stop citing Thucydides as a justification for their own warmongering in Russia

With Russia’s recent military dealings in the Donbas region, many politicians and commentators have lamented how recent generations have become ignorant of the “might makes right” philosophy of leadership. This often-cited adage appears throughout history-books in one form or another, but it originally came from the Melian dialogue in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. Many American civics classrooms teach this passage as a condemnation of demagoguery and mob rule, but any wider meaning has been lost to the average U.S. citizen. With its frequent citation as axiomatic to understanding Putin’s leadership strategies, let’s take a look at how its original implementation actually worked out for the Athenians.

War broke out between Athens and Sparta because increased naval trade with the former threatened the established militaristic control of the latter. These two powers were neighbors, and even fought together in the Persian war 20 years prior, but each believed that the other would not abide their prosperity for much longer. Pericles led the democratic system of the Athenian government at the outbreak of war, while King Archidamus had Lysander and Brasidas in control of his Spartan military. Pericles’ initial strategy was simply to defend the city without mounting any offensive front¹ because the Spartan military was larger and better trained than his own. The sanguine factions of the Athenian democracy disapproved of this strategy, and attempted to rally the public around another popular general named Cleon. For the first two years, Athens held out in large part because of an impressive wall that stretched from the city-center to the ports at Piraeus, where they could continue to trade with their allies. In 429 B.C., the ongoing plague killed Pericles, allowing Cleon the opportunity to come into power and shift military tactics from defensive to offensive. One of Athens’ strengths as a city-state were its alliances with neighboring areas, collectively known as the Delian League.² Though many of these cities disagreed with some of Pericles’ actions, they respected him much more than they did Cleon. The more this new, warmongering government asked of its members, the less inclined they were to give. Many powers attempted to test the waters while under this regime change—most famously the Mytileneans, who staged a revolt on the island of Lesbos in order to take control of all the land. Cleon, having forced them to surrender, advocated that every male should be killed and every woman be sold into slavery. This was agreed to initially, but the orders were reversed by cooler heads before they could be fully implemented. Cleon’s death in 422 B.C. would allow the Spartans to agree to a temporary truce, but when tensions rose again Cleon’s tactical philosophy would prevail over Pericles’. The Athenians sustained heavy casualties between the plague and the war itself, meaning that to face any further hostility against the Spartans they would need to find additional manpower or money for mercenaries to continue fighting.³